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The roLe oF GooD FaiTh iN DeLaware
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Ever since the Delaware Chancery Court’s 2003 decision in In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litigation (“Disney II”),1 commentators have struggled to discern meaning 
in the court’s sudden embrace of “good faith” as an avenue for director liability for 
the breach of fiduciary duty. In large part, such efforts were attempts to read between 
the lines and impart some meaning where conflicting judicial opinions had created a 
doctrinal chasm. Early assessments of Disney II speculated that “good faith” might 
serve as a way to incorporate the concept of “scienter” from securities law into the 
corporate law regime, by equating reckless or intentionally harmful decisions with 
actions “not in good faith.”2 Other scholars suggested that “good faith” was a tool—a 
concept that could be manipulated to serve the judiciary’s interests in sending 
messages in controversial cases without creating enduring legal standards that would 
govern future controversies.3
 Since Disney II, Delaware’s good faith doctrine has taken several twists and 
turns. In 2005, after a trial on the merits, Chancellor Chandler exonerated all of the 
Disney defendants from liability, concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove 
the allegations contained in their complaint.4 Although Chancellor Chandler found 
that the conduct of Disney’s directors “fell significantly short of the best practices of 
ideal corporate governance,”5 he concluded such conduct amounted to negligence at 
worst and did not constitute the kind of conduct that was beyond the protection of 
the firm’s exculpatory charter provision.6 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court’s decision, endorsing Chancellor Chandler’s interpretation of good faith.7
 After the Disney trial decision, the early interpretations of the new meaning of 
good faith remained plausible. The trial decision did not move the bar much; the 
court simply ruled that the Disney plaintiffs had not met the high standard for 
establishing director liability in the due care context. As such, the trial court decision 
left open the possibility of director liability for due care breaches, while making clear 
1. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). In Disney II, the Delaware Chancery Court denied defendants’ motion to 
dismiss a shareholder complaint against Disney directors for the breach of their fiduciary duties in 
connection with their approval of a lucrative employment contract for President Michael Ovitz and a 
subsequent decision to terminate Ovitz’s employment and award him $140 million in severance pay. 
Several years earlier, the same judge had summarily dismissed an earlier version of the complaint in the 
dispute. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998).
2. See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456, 488–94 (2004).
3. See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 
55 Duke L.J. 1, 4–8 (2005).
4. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney III), 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).
5. Id. at 697.
6. Id. at 760. Like most Delaware corporations, Disney’s corporate charter contained a provision exonerating, 
or exculpating, its directors from monetary liability for breach of fiduciary duty, other than those breaches 
specifically excluded by section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Among other 
exclusions, section 102(b)(7) forbids a corporation’s exculpation of directors from liability for “acts or 
omissions not in good faith.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). 
7. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV ), 906 A.2d 27, 63–68 (Del. 2006).
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that the standard (an intentional failure to act in the face of a known duty to act) 
would remain exceedingly difficult to meet.8
 Just as a consensus was starting to emerge on the meaning of good faith, the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Stone v. Ritter upended the conventional 
view.9 In Stone, the court announced that, contrary to Disney’s dicta, allegations of 
even an egregious breach of the duty of care were insufficient to overcome section 
102(b)(7)’s bar on a director’s monetary liability.10 Instead, to the surprise of most 
observers, the supreme court announced that Caremark claims alleging a failure to 
monitor were loyalty claims and that a mere breach of duty of care would not result 
in a director’s personal liability to the corporation.11
 In theory, Stone expanded the scope of a director’s duty of loyalty to the 
corporation. For this reason, many scholars have lauded the new location of good 
faith within the loyalty rubric.12 These scholars maintain that this newer formulation 
of good faith enhances directors’ loyalty obligations by broadening the scope of 
loyalty beyond simply avoiding conflicts of interest.13 They maintain that this newer 
conception of loyalty better comports with good governance ideals than earlier 
conceptions commonly credited by courts.14
8. See Disney III, 907 A.2d at 755.
9. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). In Stone, the court assessed shareholders’ allegations that directors of 
AmSouth Bancorporation had breached their fiduciary duties by failing to monitor the corporation’s 
compliance with federal bank secrecy and anti-money laundering rules. Id. The corporation paid $50 
million in fines in connection with these violations. Id. at 371. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld 
the Chancery Court’s dismissal of the complaint and also redefined the scope of good faith, declaring 
that good faith was not an independent duty, and holding instead that the duty to act in good faith was 
a subset of the duty of loyalty. Id. at 369–70.
10. Compare id. at 369, with Disney III, 907 A.2d at 745–46 (stating that good faith is intertwined with 
duties of care and loyalty) and Disney IV, 906 A.2d at 66 (“[T]he universe of fiduciary misconduct is not 
limited to either disloyalty in the classic sense . . . or gross negligence. Cases have arisen where corporate 
directors have no conflicting self-interest in a decision, yet engage in misconduct that is more culpable 
than simple inattention or failure to be informed of all facts material to the decision . . . . [F]iduciary 
conduct of this kind, which does not involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but is qualitatively 
more culpable than gross negligence, should be proscribed. A vehicle is needed to address such violations 
doctrinally, and that doctrinal vehicle is the duty to act in good faith.”).
11. Stone, 911 A.2d at 367, 369–70. In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation is the classic case 
in which shareholders sought recovery of fines and penalties Caremark had paid for violations of federal 
law. The plaintiffs sought to hold Caremark’s directors liable for the corporation’s losses on the theory 
that directors had failed to adequately monitor the corporation’s compliance with law. In approving the 
parties’ settlement, Chancellor Allen reasoned that although directors have an obligation to establish a 
system for monitoring a corporation’s compliance with the law, decisions reached in good faith regarding 
the design and scope of such a system are beyond judicial scrutiny under the business judgment rule. In 
re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
12. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability 
in Corporate Law, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1131 (2006); Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty 
in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 457 (2009); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. 
Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1769 (2007). 
13. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 12, at 1770, 1779–80; Gold, supra note 12, at 461–63.
14. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 12, at 1780–88, 1796; Gold, supra note 12, at 526–28. 
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 This article takes a different view of Delaware’s good faith jurisprudence. Rather 
than seeking to unpack good faith’s meaning through intense doctrinal analysis, the 
article analyzes developments in good faith jurisprudence from a political perspective, 
with the view that federal regulatory developments have impacted significantly the 
development of the good faith doctrine. Acknowledging the political context 
surrounding these decisions helps to explain the jurisprudential shifts that otherwise 
are difficult to square. This article shows how variations in the courts’ interpretation 
of good faith correspond with shifts in the nation’s political and economic climate. 
When federal governance reforms loomed in 2002 and 2003 after major corporate 
scandals, good faith assumed greater prominence in Delaware. As the federal 
preemptive threat faded, courts retired this weapon from their arsenal.
 Part II of the article explains how good faith first emerged as an independent 
duty that appeared to pose a significant risk of personal liability for directors. It links 
this phoenix-like rise of good faith to the 2001–2002 corporate governance scandals 
exemplified by the WorldCom and Enron frauds. This Part also reviews the courts’ 
subsequent retreat from the recognition of an independent duty of good faith. It ties 
this development to the dissipation of what seemed to be a real threat of federal 
preemption and the emergence of a political backlash against federal corporate 
regulation that afforded Delaware space to maintain more permissive corporate 
governance standards. Part III takes account of recent political developments in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. It notes expanding federal engagement on 
major governance issues and details the response of Delaware’s legislature and its 
courts. This Part demonstrates that Delaware’s legislature took action aimed at 
deterring further federal regulation on proxy access. However, despite expanding 
federal engagement on executive compensation matters, Delaware courts have yet to 
signal a shift in fiduciary doctrine. An important exception to this stasis is the 
Delaware Court of Chancery decision in In re Citigroup Derivative Litigation, which 
allowed a typically unpromising waste claim to survive a motion to dismiss.15
ii. a pOLitiCaL aCCOUnt Of gOOd faith JUrisprUdEnCE
 When viewed through the prism of national politics, the helter-skelter nature of 
Delaware’s good faith doctrine begins to develop coherence. Through this prism, 
Delaware’s prime movers in corporate law—the bar, the legislature, and the judiciary—
seek always to stay a step ahead of federal regulators on governance issues. During 
good economic times when shareholders and citizens are happy, Delaware’s corporate 
policies can afford to be more lax, a posture that satisfies corporate managers and 
helps protect Delaware’s franchise.16 However, when scandals erupt or the economy 
sours, restrictive federal legislation and new rules are proposed to address the crisis.17
15. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). See infra text accompanying notes 148–54. 
16. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 619, 634–35 (2006).
17. See id. at 635; see also Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 
Wash. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997).
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 When new rules loom on the federal agenda, they threaten to undercut the appeal 
of Delaware law and might limit the power of Delaware’s judiciary by taking certain 
issues “off the table.”18 In response to these threats, policymakers in Delaware appear 
to work in tandem to discourage new federal mandates while advocating for the 
preservation of Delaware’s laissez-faire approach on governance issues.19 Thus, in 
Delaware, courts tend to tighten fiduciary standards when federal reforms seem 
imminent. Judges tout these tougher standards in extra-judicial writings to show the 
public and federal policymakers that they take governance matters seriously.20
 A. The Political Framework
 The view that shifts in Delaware jurisprudence and legislative amendments form 
part of an effort to maintain the state’s dominance in the race for corporate charters 
is a common refrain in the corporate law literature, dating back at least as far as 
William Cary’s famous article in which he coined the term “race for the bottom.”21 
More recently, scholars have observed that Delaware’s dominance in corporate law is 
threatened more by developments at the federal level than by any competitive efforts 
advanced in other states.22 Proponents of this view suggest that many shifts in state 
corporate law correlate with efforts brewing in Congress or the Securities and 
18. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1573, 1588–89 (2005); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev 588, 591–92 
(2003).
19. See, e.g., William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate 
Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 953, 
978–79 (2003) (“From the perspective of Delaware and other states, the 2002 Reforms are somewhat 
problematic because they supplement our principles-based, substantive corporation laws with a variety 
of specific requirements that are not part of any overall system of corporate governance.”); E. Norman 
Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. 
Corp. L. 441, 444 (2003) (referring to Chandler and Strine’s article and expressing concern that federal 
mandates “may tend to destabilize some of the features of Delaware law that benefit stockholders”); 
Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 Bus. 
L. 1, 2 (2005) (“We argue that [the] back-and-forth between the vague and the concrete, the stringent 
and the lax, enables the states to generate a more subtle and effective form of regulation than the federal 
pattern of enacting governance mandates.”). Authors Chandler and Strine are Chancellor and Vice 
Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery, respectively. Authors Steele and Veasey were each 
serving as Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court at the time they wrote the referenced articles.
20. See Charles Elson, What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation? A Roundtable Moderated by Charles Elson, 
Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan. 2003, at 68, 76 (“In particular, I urge you to read our opinion in the Disney 
case . . . . In the end, we said that the shareholder group’s arguments were not good enough to justify 
setting entirely aside the ruling of the Court of Chancery in favor of the Disney board. We did say, 
though, that we would be willing to allow the stockholders to file a new pleading.”); see also Veasey, 
supra note 19, at 447 (disputing the “myth” that there is no limit in Delaware on “what compensation 
committees may award CEOs and other senior managers”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 18, at 1575. 
21. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 666 
(1974); see also Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev 
861 (1969).
22. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 18, at 590, 639–42, 644–46; Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in 
the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. Corp. L. 625, 628–39 (2004); Kahan & Rock, supra note 18, at 1575.
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Exchange Commission (SEC) to tighten conduct standards for public company 
officials.23
 Evidence of a correlation between doctrinal shifts and federal reform was most 
stark as the nation responded to the revelation of massive fraud at some of the 
country’s most revered companies.24 Although the names Enron and WorldCom are 
most closely associated with the 2001–2002 scandals, many other well-known 
companies were revealed to have falsified financial reports at the advent of the new 
century.25 Congress responded to these accounting scandals by holding hearings and 
proposing legislation aimed at reforming corporate America. President George W. 
Bush joined the efforts with a pledge to restore corporate responsibility and rid 
corporate America of the “bad apples in the barrel.”26
 This hostile rhetoric aimed at corporate officials coupled with a prolonged stock 
market slide raised concerns among Delaware’s leaders that federal reforms might 
encroach significantly on state terrain.27 This fear became reality when Congress 
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”).28 The legislation 
included broad reforms aimed at improving financial reporting practices at publicly 
traded corporations.29
 Sarbanes-Oxley imposed a slew of new requirements on directors of publicly 
traded companies. First, it set out new rules governing the structure and duties of the 
audit committee of the board of directors. Under the new law, all members of a listed 
company’s audit committee must be independent of management,30 and at least one 
audit committee member is expected to be a financial expert.31 Sarbanes-Oxley 
requires that the audit committee have the authority to hire and fire the auditors, hire 
23. See Jones, supra note 22, at 643–46.
24. See Rebecca Smith, Enron Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, Sues Dynegy, Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at 
A3; see also Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom’s Collapse: The Overview; Extra Level of Scrutiny 
in WorldCom’s Bankruptcy, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2002, at C1.
25. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just 
Might Work), 35 Conn. L. Rev. 915, 936–37 (2003).
26. See Howard Fineman, Living Politics: McCain Remains Bush’s Top Nemesis, Newsweek, July 10, 2002, 
available at http://www.newsweek.com/2002/07/09/living-politics-mccain-remains-bush-s-top-nemesis.
html; Leslie Wayne, Corporate Conduct: The Reaction; A Talk on Corporate Integrity Heard in the Street and 
the Suite, N.Y. Times, July 10, 2002, at C1; Jim Landers & G. Robert Hillman, Bush Vows Corporate 
Crackdown; Lawmakers Say Public is Insisting on a Remedy for Scandals, Dallas Morning News, July 9, 
2002, at 1A.
27. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law Implications 
of the Enron Debacle, 57 Bus. Law. 1371, 1372 (2002) (remarking that Congress may be tempted to 
federalize key elements of state corporate law and warning of the “risks” of such preemption).
28. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11 
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
29. See President Bush Signs into Law Broad Accounting Reform Legislation, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
1303 (Aug. 5, 2002).
30. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006).
31. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 407.
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its own experts, and set its own budget.32 Finally, in section 404, Sarbanes-Oxley 
created new requirements for an annual audit of a corporation’s internal controls.33
 Sarbanes-Oxley also banned several practices permitted under state law. Most 
notably, it bans corporate loans to directors and executives, a practice permitted under 
Delaware corporate law. 34 These new corporate governance standards represented a 
sharp departure from Delaware’s traditional laissez-faire approach to corporate 
oversight. With these changes, Sarbanes-Oxley “federalized” significant portions of 
American corporate law, displacing permissive state law rules with new mandatory 
federal requirements.35 Sarbanes-Oxley thus set the stage for a public relations 
campaign by Delaware jurists that seemed aimed at preserving their sphere of 
inf luence.36 Delaware judges waged this campaign through public speeches, law 
review articles, and most importantly by effecting a shift on important doctrinal 
tenets during the period directly following the big governance scandals and the 
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley.37 These efforts seemed designed to persuade the public 
and national policymakers that Delaware was up to the task of addressing corporate 
malfeasance, making further preemption of state law unnecessary.38
 This endeavor by Delaware jurists is a delicate balancing act. Judges need to 
bolster their legitimacy by showing they are up to the task of applying meaningful 
standards and protecting shareholder interests and the national interest in a smoothly 
functioning economy. At the same time, Delaware’s policymakers are mindful of the 
importance of the corporate franchise and can ill afford to alienate the corporate 
managers that are the source of franchise fees that fill the state’s coffers. This tension 
between the pursuit of political legitimacy and satisfying the parochial interests of 
the Delaware citizenry by protecting the corporate franchise goes far in explaining 
the judiciary’s preference for indeterminate, open-ended jurisprudence that allows 
judges to manage the competing concerns of these very different audiences.
 On this view of corporate federalism, the new “good faith” doctrine embraced 
f leetingly in Disney has served mostly as a ploy that allowed Delaware’s judiciary to 
look tough without having to act tough. The court invoked “good faith” to help 
forestall further federal governance reforms that might threaten Delaware as the 
32. Id. § 301.
33. Id. § 404.
34. Compare id. § 402, with Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 122(14) (2009) (permitting a corporation to “lend 
money for its corporate purposes”).
35. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 26 Reg. 26, 28 (2003).
36. See Jones, supra note 22, at 643–47.
37. See id.; see, e.g., Disney II, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 
917 (Del. Ch. 2003) (denying a special litigation committee’s motion to dismiss a shareholder derivative 
suit against Oracle’s directors).
38. See, e.g., Elson supra note 20, at 77 (“I trust at the end of the day, the system will correct itself. If we 
don’t fix it, Congress will, but I hope they’ve gone as far as they’re going to have to go.” (quoting E. 
Norman Veasey)). 
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nation’s primary corporate regulator. The judiciary later retreated from the same 
standard after the threat of federal preemption had receded.
 B. The Disney Pirouettes
 It is difficult to make sense of the emergence of good faith without first recapping 
the legal drama inspired by the Walt Disney Company’s ill-fated association with 
super-agent Michael Ovitz. The familiar tale began in 1995 when Disney Chief 
Executive Officer Michael Eisner hired his good friend Michael Ovitz as his second 
in command.39 Ovitz received a lucrative employment contract that included unusual 
severance provisions. Under the terms of the contract, if Ovitz were terminated 
without cause (a non-fault termination) he was entitled to receive his full salary and 
maximum bonus for the remainder of the term plus the immediate vesting of his 
stock options.40 By all accounts, Ovitz’s performance at Disney was dismal and Eisner 
was soon looking for a way out of the contract. When efforts to arrange for an 
amicable parting failed, Eisner granted Ovitz a non-fault termination, handing over 
$140 million in severance despite Ovitz’s poor performance.41
 Disney shareholders sued, claiming that the directors had breached their fiduciary 
duties by approving Ovitz’s agreement without informing themselves of its true costs. 
They argued the contract guaranteed payment for failure as it offered Ovitz more in 
compensation the sooner he was terminated by Disney.42 Plaintiffs also maintained 
that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by standing idly by as Eisner 
arranged for his friend’s lucrative departure. In sum, the plaintiffs claimed Disney’s 
directors breached their duties of loyalty and care and wasted corporate assets.43
 In 1998, in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation (“Disney I”), the Delaware 
Court of Chancery dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, holding that the challenged 
board decisions were protected by the business judgment rule.44 In 2000, the Delaware 
Supreme Court affirmed this ruling.45 However, the supreme court reversed one 
aspect of Disney I to permit the plaintiffs to amend their complaint and replead 
allegations that Disney directors had breached their fiduciary duties by failing to 
become fully informed when they approved the Ovitz agreement and the non-fault 
termination.46
39. Disney I, 731 A.2d 342, 352 (Del. Ch. 1998).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 350.
42. See id. at 352.
43. Id. at 353.
44. Id. at 362, 364.
45. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249 (Del. 2000).
46. Id. at 267.
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 In May 2003, Chancellor Chandler ruled on the plaintiffs’ second amended 
complaint in Disney II.47 In a surprising decision, he found that the amended 
complaint sufficiently alleged that Disney’s directors failed to act in good faith such 
that the company’s exculpatory charter provision might not shield them from 
liability.48 According to the Chancellor, the new complaint supported the claim that 
Disney directors had consciously disregarded their duties, adopting a “‘we don’t care 
about the risks’ attitude” on an important corporate decision.49 Thus, if the plaintiffs 
were able to prove these allegations at trial, the directors would face personal liability 
for the harm their omissions caused to the corporation.
 In 2005, after thirty-seven days of trial, Chandler ruled on the merits of plaintiffs’ 
claims.50 He concluded that the Disney directors’ conduct, while perhaps regrettable,51 
did not rise to the level of “bad faith” conduct.52 In this opinion, the Chancellor laid 
out the types of conduct that might constitute acts and omissions not in good faith, 
beyond the protection of an exculpatory charter provision. He held that “intentional 
dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities, is an appropriate 
(although not the only) standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in 
good faith.”53 The plaintiffs appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, which in 
2006 affirmed the trial court decision, bringing to an end one of the most dramatic 
corporate controversies in recent memory.54 The Delaware Supreme Court endorsed 
Chancellor Chandler’s definition of good faith and agreed that the Disney directors 
satisfied that standard.55
 The underlying basis for these see-sawing assessments of the merits of the Disney 
plaintiffs’ claims comes into sharper focus when placed against the backdrop of the 
major corporate scandals that consumed the nation’s attention throughout 2002 and 
2003. When the Enron and WorldCom scandals broke, judges spoke out publicly 
and warned corporate directors to take their duties more seriously.56 In these public 
comments, they emphasized good faith and independence as concepts that might be 
47. Disney II, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
48. Id. at 286. 
49. Id. at 289.
50. Disney III, 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005).
51. Id. (“[T]here are many aspects of defendants’ conduct that fell significantly short of the best practices of 
ideal corporate governance.”).
52. Id. at 760 (holding that the directors “did not act in bad faith, and were at most ordinarily negligent, in 
connection with the hiring of Ovitz and the approval of [his contract]”). In his opinion, Chancellor 
Chandler equated the statutory phrase “not in good faith” with “bad faith” conduct, which he proceeded 
to define despite the fact that the term “bad faith” does not appear in section 102(b)(7). See generally 
Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Director’s Good Faith, 55 Buff. L. Rev. 457, 528–34 (2007).
53. Disney III, 907 A.2d at 755.
54. Disney IV, 906 A.2d 27, 35–36 (Del. 2006).
55. Id. at 67–68.
56. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 27, at 1393 (warning that “[a] decision to become the director of a public 
corporation should not be undertaken lightly”).
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tweaked in ways that would expand the scope of director culpability beyond 
conventional limits.
 For example, in a roundtable discussion published in the Harvard Business Review, 
Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Norman Veasey observed that “if directors 
claim to be independent . . . and don’t do so, or if they are disingenuous or dishonest 
about it, it seems to me that the courts in some circumstances could treat their 
behavior as a breach of the fiduciary duty of good faith.”57 Similarly, Vice Chancellor 
Leo E. Strine, Jr. advised, “the warnings to them have been too widespread for public 
company directors to claim that their acceptance of the position did not carry with it 
a burden of making a good faith effort.”58 Of particular relevance, Chief Justice 
Veasey pointed to his court’s 2000 Brehm v. Eisner decision as evidence of its close 
oversight of board conduct.59 He advised directors “to read our opinion in the Disney 
case which ties in with some of the things that have been said here . . . we felt there 
could have been something in it. In particular did Disney’s board act in good faith in 
agreeing to Mr. Ovitz’s compensation?”60
 This heated extra-judicial rhetoric in the immediate aftermath of the 2001–2002 
accounting scandals helps explain why Chancellor Chandler abruptly reversed course 
between his initial 1998 dismissal of the case in Disney I and his more sympathetic 
assessment of plaintiffs’ claims in his 2003 Disney II decision. With Disney’s odd 
procedural history, the only way around a dismissal of the action was to credit 
plaintiffs’ allegations that Disney’s directors had failed to act in good faith when they 
approved Michael Ovitz’s employment agreement and acceded to his “non-fault” 
termination. To advance the case, Chancellor Chandler had few options other than 
to rely on good faith as a route to director liability.61 Good faith loomed large because 
plaintiffs’ allegations of conflicts of interest between Ovitz, Eisner, and Disney had 
been dispensed with in his earlier opinion and the supreme court upheld those aspects 
of his ruling.62 This meant the Disney complaint could only survive the motion to 
dismiss if the court found well-pleaded plaintiffs’ allegations that the Disney board 
had failed to act in good faith.
 In summary, good faith emerged as a potential avenue for director liability in 
Delaware in 2003 with the Chancery Court’s ruling in Disney II. Until Disney II, 
57. Elson, supra note 20, at 76.
58. Strine, supra note 27, at 1394.
59. Elson, supra note 20, at 76. 
60. Id.
61. The second amended complaint was before Chancellor Chandler on a motion to dismiss for failure to 
make demand. Disney II, 825 A.2d 275, 277 (Del. Ch. 2003). To show demand futility, plaintiffs had to 
plead facts creating a “reasonable doubt” that a majority of the directors were disinterested and 
independent or that under the facts alleged the directors were not entitled to the protection of the 
business judgment rule. Id. at 285 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984)). The 
amended complaint was being evaluated only under Aronson’s second prong. Id. at 285–86. Further, 
because Disney had an exculpatory charter provision, to survive a motion to dismiss, the allegations had 
to constitute non-exculpable conduct. Id. at 286.
62. Disney I, 731 A.2d 342, 356, 360–61 (Del. Ch. 1998).
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most observers had assumed that section 102(b)(7) insulated directors completely 
from personal liability for due care breaches.63 With Disney II, good faith, which had 
seemed like something of an afterthought, suddenly took on outsized significance. 
Commentators struggled to make sense of good faith as an independent duty. Most 
suggested good faith would capture conduct that lay at the intersection of loyalty and 
care and would be invoked when courts concluded directors had misbehaved in ways 
that did not involve a conflict of interest, but nonetheless failed to satisfy vague 
notions of minimum standards of board conduct.64
 C. Good Faith After Disney
 By late 2004, the threat of more extensive federal preemption of state corporate 
law appeared to have receded. The SEC had abandoned its proposed shareholder 
access rule and reform-oriented SEC Chair William Donaldson had been replaced 
by more management-friendly Christopher Cox.65 Chief Justice Veasey, now retired, 
spearheaded the American Bar Association’s efforts to amend the Model Business 
Corporation Act to accommodate majority voting by-laws, a modest adjustment to 
voting rules aimed at quelling governance activists’ fervor for proxy access.66 
Delaware’s Bar Association soon followed suit.
 Soon thereafter, major U.S. business organizations launched a campaign to roll 
back some of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s most onerous provisions. These efforts were 
reflected in three reports released by business groups in 2006 and 2007.67 The main 
objective of these groups appeared to be to scale back Sarbanes-Oxley section 404.68 
63. Bruner, supra note 12, at 1144; Sale, supra note 2, at 462.
64. See Griffith, supra note 3, at 6, 44 (“The duties of care and loyalty have traditionally been viewed as 
distinct, with separate doctrinal requirements. Now, however, . . . good faith . . . suggests that there are 
situations in which the categories may be blended, allowing claims to survive when some but not all of the 
traditional doctrinal requirements have been met.”). Chancellor Chandler seemed to embrace Griffith’s 
description of good faith’s meaning in a lengthy footnote in Disney III, 907 A.2d 693, 746 n.402 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (asserting good faith is intertwined with the duties of care and loyalty and quoting Griffith’s 
article).
65. See Stephen Labaton, Is the S.E.C. Changing Course? N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2007, at C1.
66. In the midst of the corporate governance crisis, shareholder advocates petitioned the SEC to adopt a 
rule allowing shareholders to place their own nominees for director in the management proxy statement. 
In response to this petition, the SEC proposed Rule 14a-11, the shareholder access rule; however, the 
proposal languished in the face of fierce opposition from the business community. For a more extensive 
discussion of the proxy access battle see discussion infra at notes 84–87.
67. Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation (Nov. 30, 2006); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Commission on Regulation of U.S. 
Capital Markets in the 21st Century: Report and Recommendations (Mar. 2007), available at 
http://www.uschamber.com/reports/commission-regulation-us-capital-markets-21st-century; Sustaining 
New York’s and the U.S. Global Financial Services Leadership (Jan. 2007), http://www.nyc.gov/
html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf. 
68. Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires managers to annually assess and report on the quality and 
effectiveness of their f irms’ internal controls and requires the independent auditor to attest to 
management’s report. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006). 
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However, advocates also urged easing SEC rules and significant curbs on private 
securities litigation.69 The bold recommendations contained in these reports suggest 
a climate in which business interests no longer feared expansion of federal corporate 
regulation, but instead held high hopes of undoing much of what Congress had 
implemented in 2002.
 This backlash against Sarbanes-Oxley ref lected the political atmosphere that 
prevailed during the Disney trial, which began in late 2004, and the 2006 supreme 
court rulings in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation (“Disney IV ”)70 and Stone 
v. Ritter. In Stone, the court emphasized the limits of Disney’s good faith dicta and 
tucked good faith neatly back into the loyalty rubric.71 No longer was good faith an 
independent obligation, part of the “triad” of fiduciary duties.72 No longer could an 
egregious violation of the duty of care be equated with the failure to act in good 
faith. This new posture provided further comfort to directors that ordinary due care 
breaches would not subject them to ruinous financial liability.
 These more recent “good faith” rulings in Stone and Lyondell Chemical Co. v. 
Ryan73 are consistent with a narrative of corporate doctrine shifting with the political 
and economic environment. After the Sarbanes-Oxley fervor receded and the economy 
showed signs of recovery, Delaware courts relaxed the tough stance on “good faith” 
that judges had assumed in earlier decisions. Judges accomplished this feat not by 
denying the significance of good faith, but by cabining it once again within the duty 
of loyalty.74 After Stone so confined good faith, Lyondell made clear that the courts 
would not embrace a higher standard of director conduct than that which existed 
under Caremark.75 Simply invoking Caremark could not provide a route around 
exculpation sufficient to allow a negligence-like claim to survive a motion to dismiss.
 In this way, “good faith” has functioned as a vise, a tool that judges can tighten 
and loosen in response to economic and political controversies. This tool gives judges 
leeway to speak to multiple audiences simultaneously. To corporate activists and 
academics, strict standards and harsh rhetoric send one message. To corporate 
managers and their lawyers, ultimate absolution sends another.
69. See, e.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 67, at 16.
70. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
71. 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006); see also Hill & McDonnell, supra note 12, at 1769–70; Gold, supra note 
12, at 459–60.
72. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 12, at 1769–70.
73. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). In Lyondell, the Delaware Supreme Court overruled a Chancery Court 
ruling denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs had alleged that directors 
breached their duties by failing to ensure that the shareholders received the best price available in the 
merger of the company. They claimed the directors’ failure to take any action when they became aware 
the company was “in play” constituted a failure to act in good faith. The Delaware Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had, at most, stated a claim for failure to act with due care and could 
prevail on a good faith claim only by proving the directors had “knowingly and completely failed to 
undertake their responsibilities.” Id. at 243–44.
74. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70.
75. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 240–41.
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iii. thE CLiMatE fOr gOVErnanCE rEfOrM aftEr thE finanCiaL Crisis
 As this article asserts, Delaware has calibrated its good faith doctrine in response 
to economic and political conditions associated with the 2001–2002 accounting 
scandals, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the subsequent backlash against the new law. Given 
this assessment, it makes sense to consider whether Delaware is again tightening the 
fiduciary vise in response to public outcry related to the 2008 financial crisis. While 
there is little evidence of a dramatic shift in Delaware’s fiduciary doctrine, legislative 
developments suggest Delaware has once again formulated corporate law policy with 
one eye on developments in Washington.
 As with the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals, the 2008 financial 
collapse and subsequent government bailout have significantly altered the federal 
corporate governance landscape. The ascendance of a Democratic administration 
and the change in leadership at the SEC also revived governance reforms that were 
rejected or tabled during the Bush Administration.76 In addition to the normal policy 
shifts that occur when control of the presidency shifts parties, the bailout brought 
significant changes in the relationship between government and business. After the 
bailout, federal officials participated directly in business decisions of companies 
benefitting from government support. Officials overseeing the rescued firms replaced 
CEOs, selected new directors, forced mergers, and made key decisions on issues 
from closing car dealerships and product lines to overseeing the pay and perks of 
senior corporate executives.77
 Two prominent issues now on the federal regulatory agenda encroach particularly 
on the territory traditionally conceived as part of the states’ purview. Federal initiatives 
to provide shareholder access to the corporate proxy and oversee executive 
compensation practices present the most direct threat to Delaware’s continued 
76. For example, Congress took up legislation to authorize the SEC to regulate hedge funds and to adopt a 
proxy access rule, two issues the SEC had weighed but failed to act on during Chairman Cox’s term. In 
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006), a federal court invalidated the SEC’s hedge fund rule 
adopted in 2004, and the SEC declined to take further action on the issue. In 2007, the SEC considered 
and rejected a proxy access rule. See discussion infra Part III.A; see also Renee M. Jones, Will The SEC 
Survive Financial Regulatory Reform?, 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 609, 615–16 (2010).
77. Among other business decisions, government regulators played a key role in replacing the CEO at 
General Motors Corp. and overseeing the reorganization of GM and Chrysler. The reorganization 
included the elimination of divisions and brands, the closing of car dealerships, and a brokered merger 
between Chrysler and Fiat. See, e.g., Sheldon Alberts, My Way or The Highway, Obama Says; Takes Ailing 
Carmakers to Task; Chrysler Must Reach Merger Deal with Fiat Within 30 Days as a Condition for New Aid, 
The Gazette (Montreal), Mar. 31, 2009, at A3; Peter Whoriskey & Kendra Marr, U.S. Plans Key Role 
in Naming GM Board; Government’s Sway Over Firms It Aids Is Topic of Debate, Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 
2009, at A01. In addition, the government oversaw a massive reorganization of the financial sector, 
including brokering the merger of Bear Stearns with JP Morgan and the merger of Bank of America 
with Merrill Lynch, and overseeing management decisions at the bailed-out financial firms. See 
Binyamin Appelbaum, Lewis Loses Chairman Role at Bank of America, Wash. Post, Apr. 30, 2009, at 
A14; Binyamin Appelbaum, Smoke Clears on Shotgun Merger; From the Details of BofA-Merrill Deal, 
Lawmakers Draw Arguments for Reform, Wash. Post, June 12, 2009, at A14; Neil Irwin & David Cho, 
Fed Takes Broad Action to Avert Financial Crisis; Central Bank Backs Sale of Bear Stearns, Cuts Key Interest 
Rate, Extends New Credit, Wash. Post, Mar. 17, 2008, at A1; Joe Nocera, Pay Cuts, but Little Headway 
in What Matters Most, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 2009, at B1.
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primacy on corporate governance matters. The reaction in Delaware to these 
unfolding federal initiatives has been consistent with the dynamic view of corporate 
federalism that this article advances.78 Just as in the early 2000s, Delaware’s corporate 
policymakers seemed to react to federal corporate governance activism by adjusting 
their approach on salient governance issues.79
 A. The Battle Over Proxy Access
 The most dramatic indication of Delaware’s sensitivity to its precarious position 
vis-á-vis the federal government are recent statutory amendments to Delaware’s 
corporate code that permit binding by-laws providing for proxy access.80 In April 2009, 
Delaware’s legislature adopted amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law 
which permit corporations to adopt by-laws that give shareholders access to the 
corporate proxy statement for the purpose of nominating directors.81 The new statutory 
provisions permit shareholder access but do not make it mandatory. The Delaware 
Bar’s efforts to adopt optional shareholder access provisions appeared to be an attempt 
to get out in front of Congress and the SEC by allowing, as an option, reforms that 
would become mandatory if imposed by the SEC or Congress.82 This attempt to 
forestall or temper federal regulation contrasts with the states’ earlier initiative to thwart 
proxy access by embracing milder majority vote by-law proposals.83
  1. The Federal Approach
 The contemporary battle for proxy access began in 2003 when the SEC first 
proposed a new Rule 14a-11.84 The proposed rule would have allowed significant 
shareholders to include their nominees for director in the corporate proxy statement 
in certain limited circumstances.85 Despite its modest nature, the proxy proposal 
78. See Jones, supra note 22, at 644–46.
79. Id. Delaware has acted in a similar manner in the face of previous threats of federal corporate reform. 
See Roe, supra note 18, at 617–18, 643; Bratton & McCahery, supra note 16, at 685–90.
80. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 112 (2009); see also Yin Wilczek, Proxy Access Amendments to Del. Code signed 
into Law, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 728 (Apr. 20, 2009).
81. § 112; Wilczek, supra note 80. 
82. All amendments to Delaware’s corporate statute are prepared and recommended by the council of the 
Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association. Typically, Delaware’s legislature does little 
more than rubber stamp the committee’s recommendations. See Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and 
Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory Redundancy, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1273, 1288–90 (2009).
83. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, The Stockholder Franchise is Not a Myth: A Response to Professor Bebchuk, 93 
Va. L. Rev. 811, 813, 818 (2007) (suggesting that instead of mandatory proxy access, “we should 
concentrate on the majority voting movement and the newly realized power of stockholders to use 
precatory and binding bylaw proposals to good effect”).
84. See 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 to 60,789, 60,794 (Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200, 232, 240, 
249).
85. See id. (providing under the proposed rule, that shareholders or groups holding 5% of voting securities 
for more than two years would be eligible to nominate a “short slate” of directors representing a minority 
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elicited fervent opposition from major business groups.86 For example, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce threatened to sue the SEC if it adopted the rule as proposed.87 
The proposal languished at the Commission for more than a year as Chairman 
Donaldson was unable to forge a consensus among Commissioners. When Chairman 
Donaldson resigned after President Bush’s re-election in 2004, the federal proxy 
access proposal appeared dead.
 The proxy access battle was unexpectedly revived in the fall of 2006 when the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in AFSCME v. American 
International Group, Inc., rejecting the SEC’s interpretation of Rule 14a-8.88 Rule 
14a-8(i)(8) allowed corporations to exclude shareholder proposals that “relate to an 
election of directors.” In recent no-action letters, the SEC staff had concluded that 
corporations could exclude proposals to amend corporate by-laws to provide for proxy 
access even though such proposals sought only to establish procedures for future 
elections. This interpretation conflicted with the SEC’s prior interpretation of the 
same rule.89 The Second Circuit thus rejected the SEC’s new position, deeming it 
arbitrary, and held that AIG was required to include the by-law proposal in its next 
proxy statement.90
 The AFSCME decision presented a quandary for the SEC as it was binding only 
in the Second Circuit, creating the potential for conf lict with rulings in other 
circuits.91 Because of the potential for a circuit split, if the SEC did nothing, different 
standards for proxy access proposals might govern in different parts of the country. 
To resolve this conflict, the Commission revisited the question of proxy access in 
2007. In an unusual move, the Commission released two competing proposals. The 
first proposal, the “access rule,” would have allowed proxy access by-laws like the one 
at issue in AFSCME.92 The “no-access” proposal released the same day codified the 
of the board and that the right to submit nominations would accrue one year after a “triggering event” 
occurred which demonstrated shareholders dissatisfaction with the incumbent board). 
86. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Counters SEC Proposal: Changes to 
Voting Rules Bad for Shareholders, Companies (Dec. 19, 2003), available at http://www.uschamber.
com/press/releases/2003. 
87. Edward Iwata, Chamber Threatens Suit on Board Nominating Plan, USA Today, Mar. 11, 2004, at 3B. 
88. 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006). Rule 14a-8, the SEC’s shareholder proposal rule, requires corporations to 
include proposals from shareholders in the corporate proxy statement distributed in connection with the 
annual meeting of shareholders. Corporations can exclude proposals deemed inappropriate under the 
rule. The SEC regularly releases “no-action” letters to advise shareholders and corporations on which 
proposals are excludable under Rule 14a-8. Id. at 123–25.
89. Id. at 128. 
90. Id. at 123. 
91. Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 53, 74–78 
(2008).
92. Securities and Exchange Commission, Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 
Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,469 (proposed July 27, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
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SEC’s pre-AFSCME position.93 In December 2007, over objections from the 
democratic Commissioners, the SEC adopted the “no-access” rule.94
 By 2009, the prospects for federal proxy access again appeared bright. New SEC 
Chair Mary Schapiro promised to revisit the issue and Congress embarked on 
financial reform legislation that would confirm the SEC’s power to adopt proxy 
access rules, protecting the SEC from threatened legal challenges.95 In June 2009, 
the SEC released a fourth proxy access proposal that included a new Rule 14a-11 
similar to the 2003 version.96 The SEC also proposed amending Rule 14a-8 yet 
again to permit shareholder access by-laws that went beyond the requirements of 
proposed Rule 14a-11.97 In August 2010, after the Dodd-Frank Act conferred to the 
SEC authority to adopt rules regulating proxy access,98 the SEC adopted a modified 
version of the 2009 proposals. New Rule 14a-11 gives individuals or groups 
representing at least 3% of voting power of a corporation the right to include nominees 
for up to 25% of board seats in the management proxy statement.99 Rule 14a-8(i)(8) 
was amended to allow shareholders to propose by-laws that would supplement, but 
not abrogate, Rule 14a-11.
 The new rules were scheduled to take effect in November 2010. In September 
2010, however, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable sued, 
challenging the legality of Rule 14a-11.100 Among other claims, the Chamber alleged 
the SEC had not followed proper procedures when adopting the rule and failed to 
assess adequately its costs.101 The SEC stayed implementation of its proxy access 
93. Id. at 43,488, 43,491.
94. 17 C.F.R. § 240, 14a-8 (2009).
95. Melissa Klein Aguilar, Washington Brews With Looming Governance Reform, Compliance Wk., May 5, 
2009, available at http://www.complianceweek.com/article/5388/washington-brews-with-looming-
governance-reform; see Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th 
Cong. § 7222 (2009) (as passed by the House on December 11, 2009; Restoring American Financial 
Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 973 (2010)) (enacted). 
96. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 
29,024, 29,038 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 274). 
Unlike the 2003 version of Rule 14a-11, under the 2009 proposal, proxy access would not be conditioned 
upon the occurrence of a “triggering event.” In addition, the minimum ownership thresholds for 
submitting director nominations would be lowered from 5% to a range from 1% to 5% depending on a 
company’s size, and qualified shareholders would be allowed to nominate directors for up to 25% of the 
board seats.
97. See id. 
98. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010).
99. Securities and Exchange Commission, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 
56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
100. See Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Joins Business Roundtable in Lawsuit 
Challenging Securities Exchange Commission (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.uschamber.com/
press/releases/2010/september/us-chamber-joins-business-roundtable-lawsuit-challenging-securities-an.
101. See id.
515
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 55 | 2010/11
rules pending court proceedings.102 Thus, the new rules will not take effect for the 
2011 proxy season.103 It remains to be seen how the court will rule, and how the SEC 
might respond to an adverse ruling, but it seems safe to assume that proxy access is 
an idea whose time will come . . . eventually.104
  2. Delaware’s Evolving Stance on Proxy Access
 Delaware’s evolving position on proxy access resembles a thrust and parry 
response to action at the federal level. When proxy access first appeared on the 
federal agenda in 2003, state bar officials acted forcefully to block it. Former Chief 
Justice Norman Veasey led this effort from his perch as the Chair of the American 
Bar Association’s Corporate Law Committee.105 In this position, Veasey promoted 
majority voting by-laws as an alternative to proxy access. Veasey argued that majority 
voting would obviate the need for proxy access by making a shareholder “withhold” 
vote more meaningful.106 Under Veasey’s leadership, the Model Business Corporation 
Act was amended to better facilitate majority voting by-laws.107 The Delaware Bar’s 
corporate law council shepherded through similar amendments to Delaware’s General 
Corporation Law.108
 Despite the apparent reprieve from federal regulation indicated by the demise of 
the SEC’s 2003 proxy access proposal, Delaware’s leaders remained wary of the 
threat posed by investors’ sustained advocacy for proxy access. Some bar leaders and 
102. In the Matter of the Motion of Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States of America for Stay of Effect of Commissions Facilitating Shareholder Director Nomination 
Rules, No. S7-10-09 (Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/33-9149.pdf.
103. Yin Wilczek, Briefing Schedule in Proxy Access Case Indicates New Rules Will Not Apply in 2011, 42 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2018 (Oct. 25, 2010).
104. Cf. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time 
Has Not Come, 59 Bus. Law. 67 (2003) (arguing that within the context of new regulatory rules, “the 
adoption of proposals to facilitate election contests is an unwarranted step that offers little apparent 
benefit and threatens significant harm”). 
105. See Phyllis Diamond, ABA Panel Weighing Possible Changes to Model Act on Voting for Directors, 37 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 476 (Mar. 14, 2005) (describing Veasey’s efforts to advance majority voting as an 
alternative to the SEC’s proxy access proposal); Rachel McTague, Former Del. Supreme Court Chief 
Justice: Federal Power Threatens Role of Delaware Law, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1493 (BNA) (Aug. 16, 
2004).
106. See E. Norman Veasey, Remarks at the SEC Spotlight on Security Holder Director Nominations 
(March 4, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/transcript03102004.txt. 
Under a majority voting regime, directors who failed to receive the affirmative votes of a majority of 
shares voting at a meeting would be expected to resign their board seats. 
107. See generally Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act: Amendments to Chapter 7 and Related Provisions Relating to Shareholder Action Without a 
Meeting, Chapters 8 and 10 Relating to Shareholder Voting for the Election of Directors, and Chapter 13 Relating 
to Appraisal and Other Remedies for Fundamental Transactions, 61 Bus. Law. 1427 (2006) (discussing, inter 
alia, changes to Model Business Corporation Act election provisions concerning plurality results and 
proxy votes).
108. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 141(b), 216 (2009).
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judges concluded it was better to join them than try to beat them.109 The emerging 
view was that it was preferable to allow proxy access as an option at the state level 
than to face the risk of a federally imposed proxy access regime. The key distinction 
being that “no-access” would remain the default rule at the state level, while a federal 
rule would make proxy access mandatory under certain conditions.
 The first clear sign of a shift in the state’s approach on proxy access was the 
Delaware Supreme Court decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan.110 
Ruling on a certified question from the SEC, the Delaware Supreme Court held that 
shareholder-proposed proxy access by-laws were permissible under state law, but that 
the specific shareholder by-law in question violated Delaware law.111 Then, in April 
2009, Delaware’s legislature adopted amendments to the Delaware General 
Corporation Law which codified the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling in CA, Inc.112 
New section 112 of the Delaware General Corporation Law permits the adoption of 
by-laws that give shareholders access to the corporate proxy statement for the purpose 
of nominating directors.113 The new provision allows for shareholder access but does 
not make it mandatory. Later, the Delaware Bar Association submitted a formal 
comment letter to the SEC criticizing the Commission’s 2009 proxy access proposal.114 
This was the first time the Bar Association had ever commented on a proposed SEC 
rule.115
 In summary, Delaware policymakers first responded to federal proxy access 
proposals by promoting majority voting by-laws as an alternative to proxy access. 
Despite states’ acceptance of majority voting by-laws, shareholder activists continued 
109. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive Thoughts 
on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 Bus. Law. 1079, 1094–98 (2008) (advocating for corporate acceptance 
of optional proxy access by-laws).
110. 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
111. Id. at 237, 240. At issue was a proposal by CA, Inc. shareholders to adopt a by-law mandating the 
reimbursement of expenses related to proxy contests if a shareholder slate received a minimum threshold 
of votes in a director election. Id. at 229–30; see also, Lisa M. Fairfax, Delaware’s New Proxy Access: Much 
Ado About Nothing?, 11 Tenn. J. Bus. L. 87, 104–05 (2009). 
112. See Fairfax, supra note 111, at 88. 
113. § 112; Yin Wilczek, Proxy Access Amendments to Del. Code Signed Into Law; Provisions Effective Aug. 1, 41 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 728 (Apr. 20, 2009). Delaware Bar Association’s Council of the Corporation 
Law Section member, Lawrence Hamermesh reported that the amendments were prompted by 
Delaware’s recent decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan. See Yin Wilczek, Del. Legislature 
Mulling Proposals on Proxy Access; Law Likely to Pass, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 528 (Mar. 23, 
2009). Hamermesh stated that “[t]he decision was a primary catalyst for the proposed amendments, 
which go a long way to clarify what the impact of the court’s decision was.” Id.
114. Letter from James L. Holzman, Chair, Council of the Corp. L. Section, Del. Bar Ass’n to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n 1, 2 (July 24, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-10-09/s71009-65.pdf (“[A] single rule would unnecessarily deprive Delaware corporations 
of the f lexibility state law confers to deal effectively with myriad different circumstances that legislators 
and rulemakers cannot anticipate, and would thereby undermine a key element of the state system of 
corporate governance that has been largely successful for decades.”); see also Fairfax, supra note 111, at 
107–08.
115. Letter from James L. Holzman, supra note 114. 
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to press for proxy access by submitting binding shareholder access by-law proposals 
under SEC Rule 14a-8. Proxy access returned to the federal agenda in 2007—and 
again in 2009—prompting policymakers in Delaware to go further. In a first nod to 
proxy access, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled on a certified question from the 
SEC that proxy access by-laws were permissible under state law (although the by-law 
in question was not consistent with state law).116 The Delaware Bar and legislature 
quickly embraced the ruling and worked to amend the statute to codify it.117 The 
Delaware Bar Association then took the unprecedented step of formally urging the 
SEC not to adopt a mandatory shareholder access rule.118
 B. Executive Compensation
 In the area of executive compensation, the interplay between state and federal 
policy has been less direct. In the banking arena, new federal standards on executive 
compensation preempt state law to a significant extent. Through the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) restrictions and pay czar oversight, the federal government 
oversees pay practices at all firms receiving government support. Furthermore, 
corporate governance provisions included in the Dodd-Frank Act ensure continued 
federal oversight of pay practices for financial firms and non-financial firms alike. 
Despite pending federal financial reforms, Delaware courts have continued to hew to 
the defendant-friendly interpretation of “good faith” adopted in Disney IV and Stone 
v. Ritter. The court’s ruling in In re Citigroup Derivative Litigation, however, portends 
a possible relaxation of the formidable waste doctrine.119
  1. Federal Developments
 When Congress adopted the Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,120 more 
popularly known as TARP, our government embarked on an unprecedented program 
of equity investment in the nation’s most significant financial institutions. Initially, 
TARP contained relatively modest compensation provisions which required the 
Treasury Department to set guidelines for compensation for companies receiving 
TARP funds.121
 In February 2009, President Obama announced new Treasury Guidelines on 
Executive Compensation for TARP recipients (the “Treasury Guidelines”).122 The new 
116. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237, 240 (Del. 2008).
117. See Wilczek, supra note 113. 
118. Letter from James L. Holzman, supra note 114. 
119. See infra text accompanying notes 148–54.
120. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008).
121. Id. § 111. Under TARP, Treasury was required to prohibit parachute payments, claw back bonuses based 
on cooked earnings and place “limits on compensation that exclude incentives for senior executive officers 
. . . to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial institution.” Id.
122. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions On Executive Compensation 
(Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/tg15.htm [hereinafter Press Release].
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restraints applied prospectively to recipients of future TARP payments. These 
compensation restrictions were fairly narrow, as they applied only to firms receiving 
“exceptional assistance” and affected only the five most highly compensated executives 
of the firms.123 Salary for the top five executives was capped at $500,000 per year,124 
and bonus payments to senior executives were limited to restricted stock awards that 
recipients had to hold until their firms’ TARP funds were fully repaid.125 The Treasury 
Guidelines also required TARP recipients to allow shareholders an advisory vote on 
executive compensation packages (“Say on Pay”) at future shareholder meetings.126
 In February 2009, Senator Christopher Dodd sponsored an amendment to the 
economic stimulus bill which expanded TARP’s compensation restrictions.127 The 
“Dodd Amendment” limited bonus payments to executives at TARP recipients to one-
third of their annual compensation.128 The depth of the pay restrictions varied with the 
amount of TARP funds received. For recipients of $500 million or more in TARP 
funds, the limits applied to at least the twenty most highly paid executives.129 Like the 
Treasury Guidelines, the Dodd Amendment allows bonus payments made in restricted 
stock and requires a shareholder Say on Pay on executive compensation.130 In June 
2009, the Treasury Department appointed Kenneth R. Feinberg as a special master, or 
“pay czar,” to oversee the pay practices of bailed out firms.131 In a number of high-
profile rulings, Feinberg reset compensation packages for executives of companies that 
retained TARP funds.132
123. Id.; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 
516–17 (2009) (“The term ‘senior executive officer’ means an individual who is 1 of the top 5 most 
highly paid executives of a public company . . . .”). 
124. Press Release, supra note 122.
125. See id.
126. “Say on Pay” is shorthand for a policy requiring corporations to submit executive compensation policies 
to shareholders for a non-binding, advisory vote when soliciting proxies for the annual meeting. See 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, FACT SHEET: Administration’s Regulatory Reform Agenda 
Moves Forward: Say-on-Pay (July 16, 2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg219.
htm (outlining Say on Pay requirements in draft legislation delivered to Congress).
127. The stimulus bill is formally known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009); 155 Cong. Rec. 
S1609-10 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2009) (text of Sen. Christopher Dodd amendment); see infra note 128. 
128. A summary of the Treasury Guidelines and the Dodd Amendment provisions is provided in Michael B. 
Dorff, Confident Uncertainty, Excessive Compensation & the Obama Plan, 85 Ind. L.J. 491, 529–52 (2010); 
see also Michael Maiello, Yes—You Deserve a Fat Bonus, Forbes, Mar. 16, 2009, at 28. 
129. See Dorff, supra note 128, at 546–47. 
130. Id.
131. Stephen Labaton, Treasury to Set Executives’ Pay at 7 Ailing Firms, N.Y. Times, June 11, 2009, at A1.
132. See Jim Puzzanghera, Corporate Salaries; Pay Czar Slashes Top Executives’ Compensation at Five Firms, 
L.A. Times, Mar. 24, 2010, at B1; Frank Ahrens & David Cho, Pay Czar, Federal Reserve Crack Down on 
Executive Pay, Miami Herald, Oct. 23, 2009, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2009/10/23/v-
print/1296044/pay-czar-federal-reserve-crack.html; Hibah Yousuf, No 2009 Pay for Bank of America 
CEO Ken Lewis, CNNMoney.com, Oct. 23 2009, http://www.money.cnn.com/2009/10/15/news/
companies/bofa_lewis_salary/index.htm?section=money_news_newsmakers.
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 The executive pay restrictions imposed by TARP were merely the tip of the 
iceberg for federal corporate governance reforms related to executive pay. The Dodd-
Frank Act provides for sustained federal oversight of corporate pay practices. 
Dodd-Frank imposes comprehensive federal oversight of financial firms deemed to 
pose a systemic risk to the economy.133
 The Act creates a new Financial Stability Oversight Council, composed of the 
principal federal f inancial regulators to oversee prudential management for 
systemically significant firms.134 In addition, section 956 of Dodd-Frank requires 
financial regulators to adopt rules that prohibit compensation structures that 
encourage inappropriate risks, by providing excessive compensation or that could 
lead to a material financial loss.135
 Dodd-Frank’s impact goes beyond oversight of financial institutions. Several 
provisions targeted at executive compensation apply to all public companies. For 
example, the Act mandates enhanced compensation disclosure, including a 
requirement that firms disclose the ratio between median compensation for all 
employees of a firm and the compensation for that firm’s CEO.136 It also requires a 
shareholder Say on Pay on executive compensation and golden parachutes,137 and 
reforms the structure and practices of board compensation committees.138 The Act 
also mandates stock exchanges to adopt rules requiring listed companies to maintain 
“claw back” policies for recovering incentive pay based on false financial reports.139
 In sum, through TARP, “pay czar” oversight, and Dodd-Frank’s governance 
provisions, the federal government has seized the issue of executive compensation 
and thereby marginalized Delaware law. Such broad federal engagement on pay-
related issues significantly diminishes the appeal to management of Delaware’s 
laissez faire approach on the matter. After all, the deference Delaware assures 
133. Memorandum from Steptoe & Johnson LLP to The Nat’l Ass’n. of Ins. and Financial Advisors (Mar. 
26, 2009), available at http://www.naifa.org/advocacy/documents/NAIFAHFSCGeithnerHearing.pdf. 
134. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. Law No. 111-203, §§ 111-
175, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010).
135. Id. § 956. Even before Dodd-Frank was enacted, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors released 
proposed guidance on pay structures at financial firms. See Proposed Guidance on Sound Incentive 
Compensation Policies, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,227, (Oct. 27, 2009); see generally Ahrens & Cho, supra note 132 
(discussing Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s statements regarding proposed guidance for 
firms’ long-term financial health).
136. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 953.
137. Id. § 951. Section 951 requires a shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation at least once every 
three years, and an advisory vote on golden parachute payments to be made in connection with mergers 
that are otherwise subject to shareholder approval. Id.
138. Id. § 952. Section 952 requires that compensation committees be comprised solely of independent 
directors and that committees have sole authority to hire consultants and counsel and determine their 
compensation, and requires corporations to disclose whether they employed compensation consultants 
and any potential conflicts of interest created by such engagements. Id.
139. Id. § 954.
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directors on compensation questions will be of little comfort to corporate managers 
mired in compliance requirements imposed by the new federal statute.
  2. The Delaware Approach
 So far, the Delaware courts’ response to these federal governance initiatives has 
been muted. Unlike in 2002, there have been few broad pronouncements from jurists 
denouncing federal legislation to reform financial regulation. Nor have there been 
discernible shifts in the tone or outcome of corporate law cases.140 Instead, in Lyondell 
and Citigroup courts have stood firm in reiterating Stone’s holding and refusing to 
impose liability on directors for poor decisions or extreme passivity.141
 Two of the more interesting corporate law cases decided in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis are In re American International Group Consolidated Derivative 
Litigation (AIG)142 and In re Citigroup Derivative Litigation.143 In AIG, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery allowed a complaint against AIG directors and officers for 
complicity in a financial fraud to survive a motion to dismiss.144 The fact that the 
plaintiffs’ claims were allowed to move forward in AIG does not tell us too much 
about the post-crisis approach to corporate governance. First, the conduct that was 
the subject of plaintiffs’ allegations preceded the financial crisis and concerned the 
conduct of Hank Greenberg, the former CEO who had been replaced long before 
the events that precipitated AIG’s 2008 collapse.145 Furthermore, the plaintiffs had 
alleged that the defendant directors and officers were engaged in an expansive 
financial fraud, indeed, perhaps a criminal conspiracy.146 Given the substance of the 
allegations, the fact that AIG itself had joined the plaintiffs on some claims, and the 
fact that AIG’s special litigation committee took no position with respect to the 
other claims, it is not surprising that plaintiffs’ claims survived the motion to 
dismiss.147
 The outcome of In re Citigroup Derivative Litigation was less orthodox. Although 
some commentators have heralded Citigroup as standing for the proposition that 
Delaware courts stood firm on fiduciary principles for directors despite the financial 
140. Cf. David Marcus, Laster’s Moment, The Deal Mag., Apr. 2, 2010, available at http://www.thedeal.
com/newsweekly/features/laster%27s-moment.php (suggesting an effort by Vice Chancellor Travis 
Laster to maintain Delaware’s relevance despite federal financial reforms through direct engagement in 
shareholder disputes traditionally viewed as part of the federal regulatory realm).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 73–75; infra text accompanying notes 148–54.
142. 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009).
143. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
144. 965 A.2d at 776.
145. See id. at 789.
146. Id. at 776.
147. Id. at 775–76.
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crisis, the decision on the waste claim defies such sanguinity.148 Although the 
Chancellor dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against directors for failure to monitor 
financial risks, in an unusual move he allowed a waste claim against Citigroup’s 
directors to move forward.149
 Citigroup shareholders had objected to the corporation’s severance agreement 
with departing Chairman and CEO Charles Prince.150 Under the contract, Prince 
received $68 million, “including bonus, salary, and accumulated stockholdings,” an 
office, administrative assistant, and a car and driver for up to five years.151 In 
exchange, Prince promised not to disparage Citigroup and to refrain from competing 
with the firm or soliciting its clients or employees.152 The severance agreement at 
issue in Citigroup was fairly standard fare for executives departing major U.S. 
corporations.153 With little in the way of explanation, Chancellor Chandler found 
that based on the facts alleged in the complaint, “there is a reasonable doubt as to 
whether the letter agreement meets the admittedly stringent ‘so one sided’ standard 
or . . . awarded compensation that is beyond the ‘outer limit’ described by the 
Delaware Supreme Court.”154
 The standard for evaluating a waste claim in Delaware is whether there was “an 
exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie 
beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade.”155 
Applying this vague standard, the Delaware courts acquiesced to the Disney board’s 
actions in awarding $140 million in severance to pay Michael Ovitz for his nine 
months of disastrous service at the company.156 Not only was the value of Ovitz’s 
148. See Andrew W. Stern & Alex J. Kaplan, Delaware Chancery Court Reaffirms the Business Judgment Rule’s 
Protection Against Claims of Undue Risk Taking, 12 Corp. Gov. Rpt. 72 (2009) (discussing the impact of 
Citigroup and AIG on business decisions that led to company losses).
149. See Michael J. Biles & Kimberly G. Davis, Delaware Court Allows Claims Based on Executive Compensation 
to Go Forward, Bus. L. Today, Oct. 19, 2009, at 22, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
blt/2009-09-10/keepingcurrent-corpcomp.shtml.
150. In re Citigroup Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 111–12 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
151. Id. at 138.
152. Id.
153. By comparison, former CEO Stanley O’Neal walked away from Merrill Lynch with a package valued at 
$162 million. See John Cassidy, Subprime Suspect, The New Yorker, Mar. 31, 2008, at 78. Carly Fiorina 
left Hewlett-Packard with a severance package worth up to $42 million. Carly May Get $42 million, 
CNNMoney.com, http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/12/news/newsmakers/fiorina_severance/index.htm 
(last visited Aug. 28, 2010). Former Home Depot chief received about $210 million in cash and options. 
Ylan Q. Mui, Home Depot’s CEO Resigns, And His Hefty Payout Raises Ire, Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 2007, at 
D01. Angelo Mozilo received roughly $120 million after Countrywide was acquired by Bank of 
America. Gretchen Morgenson, Panel to Review Payouts Given by Troubled Firms, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 
2008, at C3. 
154. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138.
155. Id. (citing Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000)).
156. Disney I, 731 A.2d 342, 350, 364, 380 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff ’d, Brehm, 746 A.2d at 244; see also Disney 
III, 907 A.2d 693, 758–60 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff ’d, Disney IV, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
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severance package extraordinary, his contract was structured so that he stood to earn 
more the sooner he was fired by the company. Nonetheless, the court ruled that 
neither the compensation contract nor the decision to grant Ovitz “non-fault” 
termination represented a breach of fiduciary duty by Disney’s directors.157
 Outside of the political and economic context, it is difficult to grasp why the 
Citigroup complaint was judged to state a claim for waste when the Disney complaint 
did not (especially considering that the same judge reviewed both complaints). 
Prince’s severance amount was only $68 million, some of which may have represented 
compensation he had already earned. In contrast, Disney had agreed to pay Ovitz 
compensation valued at $140 million for his ignoble nine-month tenure with the 
company. One possible explanation is that Delaware judges are more sensitive to how 
they are perceived to manage compensation issues than they were in the period that 
followed the Disney trial. Reminiscent of the 2003 Disney II ruling that allowed the 
plaintiffs’ claims to go to trial, the Delaware judiciary seems determined to 
demonstrate that it takes compensation issues seriously and is capable of handling 
such claims effectively.
iV. COnCLUsiOn
 It is still too early to assess the long-term impact of the financial crisis on the 
U.S. corporate governance regime. It is clear, however, that recent federal regulatory 
reforms threaten to reduce Delaware’s relevance in corporate governance—more so 
than the modest reforms embraced in Sarbanes-Oxley. Federal and state developments 
on shareholder access and executive compensation suggest that Delaware policymakers 
are working to maintain the state’s primacy in the traditional realm of corporate 
governance.
 In this round, Delaware’s Bar and legislature have acted more decisively than the 
courts. The proxy access reforms adopted in the spring of 2009 are the most direct 
indication of Delaware’s sensitivity to federal reforms. The significance of the courts’ 
rulings in AIG, Citigroup, and Lyondell is less clear. On one hand, in Citigroup and 
Lyondell judges continue to adhere to Stone’s positioning of Caremark claims as 
virtually unsustainable. Yet, in Citigroup, the court allowed what had long been an 
even more formidable claim of waste—to move forward. The Delaware Chancery 
Court’s decision on the waste claim may turn out to be no more significant than the 
similar denial of a motion to dismiss in Disney II, in the sense that it is unlikely that 
plaintiffs will ultimately prevail. Yet, the move may have the impact of blunting 
public criticism of the Delaware courts’ record for steadfastly protecting of directors 
from personal liability for their failures.
157. See discussion supra Part II.B.
